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Blake, Yeats, Larkin: Nihilism and the Indifferent Consolation of Post-Romanticism 
 
It was during the Irish Civil War, sometime between 1922 and 1923, that W.B. Yeats, 
ensconced in Thoor Ballylee, the Norman tower that served both as a romantic, 
Samuel Palmer-esque symbol of the poet-scholar’s separate, elevated fixedness above 
the mundane, hurly burly world of his fellow man, as well as an actual stone and 
mortar defence against intrusions from the outside world, composed a sardonically 
barbed renunciation in verse of both poetic transcendence and the possibility of any 
sort of tide-stemming defence against what he saw as a general devaluation of values. 
The poem in question is the caustically nihilistic fifth section of the apocalyptic 
sequence poem, Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen: 
Come let us mock at the great 
That had such burdens on the mind 
And toiled so hard and late 
To leave some monument behind, 
Nor thought of the levelling wind.  
 
Come let us mock at the wise; 
With all those calendars whereon 
They fixed old aching eyes, 
They never saw how seasons run, 
And now but gape at the sun. 
 
Come let us mock at the good 
That fancied goodness might be gay, 
And sick of solitude  
Might proclaim a holiday: 
Wind shrieked – and where are they? 
 
Mock mockers after that 
That would not lift a hand maybe 
To help good, wise or great 
To bar that foul storm out, 
For we traffic in mockery. 
The profound sense of hopelessness is immediately evident. The first stanza invites us 
to consider the actions and passions of ‘the great’ from a position of resigned, mocking 
passivity. The difference between them and us modern nihilists, the implication runs, is 
that we are conscious of the inexorable power of what Yeats calls ‘the levelling wind’ 
and thus harbour no illusions about the efficacy of human striving or the longevity of 
human achievement. We are cast as, to use Philip Larkin’s phrase, ‘the less deceived’, 
who have, as Yeats puts it, ‘awakened from the common dream’ to ‘dissipation and 
despair’. As Yeats writes in the third section of Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen, again 
invoking a negatory wind: 
O but we dreamed to mend 
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Whatever mischief seemed 
To afflict mankind, but now 
That winds of winter blow 
Learn that we were crack-pated when we dreamed. 
The wind, here, signals a moment of learning out of which emerges a new realisation, 
a new clarity about how things are, and with that clarity an accompanying sense of 
enlightened defeat and feelings of contempt for those who have not yet reached this 
understanding. As much as it signifies levelling destruction, then, the wind also marks 
the casting off and stripping bare of illusion. It is the wind that had once blown on 
Shakespeare’s blasted heath, allowing Lear to see man shorn of the superficial 
trappings of wealth and status as a bare, forked animal. 
 The remaining stanzas intensify this sense of revelatory negation. In the second 
stanza it is the turn of ‘the wise’ to be mocked, in this case for their misunderstanding 
of temporality. They focused upon the calendar’s artificial apportioning of time, 
remaining ignorant of the natural passage of the seasons. The implication seems to be 
that they treated time as infinite, instead of attending to the fast-emptying hourglass 
and addressing their own finitude. As a consequence they are now held stupidly 
enthralled to the sun’s diurnal pulse. In the third stanza we are invited to mock ‘the 
good’, who favour a life of happiness, sociality and celebration. Once again, the 
purging wind gives them short shrift, perhaps suggesting that to live a life that is in 
some sense worthy requires an altogether more sober, indeed sombre, frame of mind. 
In the final stanza, in what amounts to nihilism turning vertiginously back upon itself, 
perfecting the poem’s sense of complete and unrelieved darkness, we are called to 
‘mock mockers’ and rail against their passive mocking of the good, wise and great. 
 A more terse, unflinchingly direct expression of negation in verse is difficult to 
imagine. Whether, in his blackest moments, Yeats endorsed this view, is not strictly 
relevant; what potentially is of consequence is that he seems to have articulated not 
simply the failure of the Romantic ideal of poetic transcendence, but also, 
devastatingly, the absence of the availability of any immanent consolation in the wake 
of this failure. This is significant because it positions the poem as recognising and 
confronting the possible extreme implications of two prevailing tendencies frequently 
identified as either generally characteristic of, or essentially constitutive of, modernity. 
Typically referred to as the decline or end of art and nihilism or the crisis of meaning, it 
would be a mistake to allow these almost caricatural sobriquets to obscure the 
complex genealogy and far-reaching import of the twin tendencies that they name, 
even if, perhaps inevitably, neither the genealogy nor the import can be fully explored 
here. What I propose to do in this paper is to examine how these complex sets of 
issues—on the one hand the Hegelian end of art, the failure of Romanticism, the crisis 
of representation and the exhaustion of non-representative art, and, on the other, a 
radical devaluing of values, an end of grand narratives, the decline of religion and 
other meta-narratives or frameworks of truth, the collapse of the enlightenment—are, 
in a sense, constellated by Yeats’s poem and the poetic tradition of which it forms part. 
The guiding question is a simple one: what is it that Yeats’s poem is casting aside, and 
what, if anything, is there left to endorse, both in terms of aesthetics and, indeed, life 
more generally? 
 Perhaps the most appropriate first step towards answering this is to be taken 
by returning to the poem that Yeats’s poem, in an almost textbook case of Bloomian 
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misprision, seems to constitute a clinamen away from, namely William Blake’s Mock 
On, Mock On: 
Mock on, Mock on, Voltaire, Rousseau: 
Mock on, Mock on; ‘tis all in vain! 
You throw the sand against the wind, 
And the wind blows it back again. 
 
And every sand becomes a Gem 
Reflected in the beams divine; 
Blown back they blind the mocking Eye, 
But still in Israel’s paths they shine. 
 
The Atoms of Democritus 
And Newton’s Particles of light 
Are sands upon the Red sea shore, 
Where Israel’s tents do shine so bright. 
In this poem the mockers are identified, though ‘Voltaire’ and ‘Rousseau’ should also 
be understood as synecdochically standing in for the Enlightenment more generally 
and the broad move that it represents away from myth and religion, towards science 
and a more generally materialistic view of the world. The unholy trinity in Blake’s 
frequent attacks on the Enlightenment are Bacon, Newton and Locke. In Jerusalem he 
imagines these three figures as a composite spectre that is carried by its ‘two Wings, 
Voltaire, Rousseau’ to ‘teach Doubt and Experiment’ to mankind. In Blake’s view, this 
rationalistic and Deist or, even worse, atheist, way of approaching the world is more 
than simply mistaken, it is dangerously disenchanting, leading only to life’s 
diminishment.  
 The central conceit of the poem is the contrast between a grain of sand and a 
gem. Famously, of course, Blake believed that when viewed aright—that is, with 
appropriately reverential innocence—one could see ‘a World in a Grain of Sand’ 
(Auguries of Innocence), and Mock On, Mock On seems to offer an extension of that 
idea. From a materialist perspective, the grain of sand is a grain of sand and nothing 
more. Sand, like dust, is a reminder of matter’s lowest common denominator, that to 
which we shall return. For materialists, like the ancient Greek philosopher Democritus, 
this physical basis of all reality is the atom. Even the light in which the material world 
appears is, Newton argued, a stream of particles. For Blake, this emphasis on the 
physical and denial of the transcendental is self-defeating. Propagating an entirely 
immanent view of the world—akin, the suggestion seems to be, to throwing sand—is 
to make a mockery of existence. As if making just this point, the sand is blown back, 
further blinding the ‘mocking Eye’ to what Blake considers to be the reality of a deeper 
life. This deeper life only becomes apparent under the appropriate aspect shift granted 
by divine light, which radiantly transfigures base, everyday materiality. Each grain of 
sand becomes a shining ‘Gem’ and just as sand or dust signifies the entire material 
world, so too this gem-like sand serves accordingly to disclose the divinely transfigured 
context in which it appears. It is upon such sand, no less, that God’s chosen people 
shelter the divine in the tabernacular tents, as the third stanza suggests. 
 What can this reading of Blake’s poem reveal about Yeats’s poem? The 
principal difference between the two is obvious. Far from the all-destructive nihilism of 
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Yeats’s poem, Blake’s poem defies the mockers, rousingly affirming a theological 
worldview. But what is particularly telling, though easily overlooked, is the role the 
wind plays, confounding the mockers and setting the scene for Blake’s brief sketch of a 
divinely redeemed world. In other words, the wind, and by extension the whole 
natural order, is antagonistic towards the nihilistic disenchantment of reductive 
rationality and sympathetic towards all that might be thought to transcend that 
narrow view of the world, whether that be God, art, beauty or truth. Blake portrays 
the Enlightenment as broadly nihilistic in its refusal to recognise what he considered to 
be the genuine higher value of things, but the benevolent wind shows that this nihilism 
does not upset the natural order. By the time Yeats comes to write his poem, however, 
the wind is blowing in a different direction altogether: the wind is now ‘all-levelling’, a 
‘foul storm’, and thus on the side of the mockers, rather than opposed to them. By 
extension, then, in Yeats’s poem nihilism is no longer at odds with the natural order, it 
is the natural order and the mocking wind is proof of that. This clearly seems to 
constitute a victory for nihilism over anything that might aim or claim to rise above it. 
But what might that be exactly, besides Blake’s divinely transmuted world, and does its 
rejection, signalled in Yeats’s poem, amount to a rejection of Romanticism? What, that 
is to say, is the full significance of this wind change? 
 M.H. Abrams, in The Correspondent Breeze, drily observes how ‘thoroughly 
ventilated’ (1984, p.26) English romantic poetry is. What interests him in particular is 
the way in which, in Romantic poetry, ‘the wind is not only a property of the 
landscape, but also a vehicle for radical changes in the poet’s mind’, and how it is 
‘correlated with a complex subjective process’ (1984, p.26). This idea is vividly 
portrayed by Shelley in A Defence of Poetry: 
Man is an instrument over which a series of external and internal impressions are 
driven, like the alternations of an ever-changing wind over an Aeolian lyre; which move 
it, by their motion, to ever-changing melody. But there is a principle within the human 
being, and perhaps within all sentient beings, which acts otherwise than in the lyre, and 
produces not melody alone, but harmony, by an internal adjustment of the sounds or 
motions thus excited to the impressions which excite them. It is as if the lyre could 
accommodate its chords to the motions of that which strikes them, in a determined 
proportion of sound … (Shelley, 2003, p.675) 
And as ‘an invisible power known only by its effects’ (Abrams, 1984, p.42), this 
correspondent breeze is also often presented, as in Blake’s Mock On, Mock On, as a 
Geist-like force resistant to Enlightened, materialist views of the world. By poetically 
combining man’s inner nature, his outer, natural environment and at least the 
suggestion of a non-material, supersensible realm, the romantic figure of wind is able 
to range over the typical post-Cartesian worries about dualism, taking in sand, gems 
and beams divine in its accommodating airs. Understood more broadly, this is the ‘all-
sustaining air’ of Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound, which is able to transfigure the 
ordinary and reveal the transcendental truth of the material world. ‘Asia’ likens it to 
love which ‘makes the reptile equal to the God’. ‘Ione’, however, refers to the ‘twin 
nurslings of the all-sustaining air’ and ‘their sweet, sad voices’, like ‘despair / Mingled 
with love and then dissolved in sound’. This comingling of despair and love, sustained 
by the air, is, I think, significant. Confronting scientific and philosophical tendencies to 
diminish the world, it seems entirely fitting that the transformative Romantic wind 
should be expressive of despair as well as love. As Michael O’Neill in The All-Sustaining 
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Air, remarks, ‘Shelleyan “air” is always ready to rhyme with “despair”’ (2007, p.16). 
What is important is that love ultimately prevails in the poetic moment and despair 
subsides. The wind, then, as Shelley tells us in his Ode to the West Wind, is both 
‘Destroyer and preserver’. However it will not always be thus and we do not need to 
go as far forward as Yeats’s Come Let us Mock at the Great to understand this; it is 
already evident in Shelley’s The Triumph of Life which, famously left unfinished at the 
time of his premature death, seems to announce a certain end of Romanticism. 
 In The Triumph of Life the crushing, inexorable progress of the chariot is 
accompanied by what Shelley calls ‘the insulting wind’. The mocked good, wise and 
great of Yeats’s later poem are already present here as the ‘wise, / The great, the 
unforgotten’, who, too concerned with maintaining ‘thought’s empire over thought’ 
failed ‘to know themselves’, a failure with an obvious Greek provenance, but with a 
more relevant concern with regard to criticism being levelled at the Enlightenment on 
the basis of its inability to provide a secure ground of knowledge which, for Romantics 
of a broadly idealistic bent, would have to be located in the self or, at least, in a 
transcendental unity of the intellect and the sensible apprehension of the world. In 
Yeats’s poem we are invited to mock the ineffectuality of such worthies and then to 
mock ourselves, the mockers. In The Triumph of Life, these worthies, representatives 
of the Enlightenment, whom Shelley names as ‘Voltaire, / Frederick and Kant, 
Catherine and Leopold’, are themselves mockers, or as Shelley calls them, ‘spoilers’. 
But, foreshadowing Yeats’s imprecation to mock mockers, they are already ‘spoilers 
spoiled’ (a phrase Shelley, in turn, probably owes to Byron *Duffy, 1979, p.168, n.3]), 
defeated by life itself, whose cold and unforgiving light outshines the light of nature, 
which in turn outshines the light of the imagination. Harold Bloom suggests that the 
final position of The Triumph of Life is ‘total despair’. Love, in other words, which had 
once accompanied despair in the Shelleyan all sustaining air, is now absent, life having 
betrayed and overcome the inner impulses of the heart. This, then, is the end of 
Romantic consolation as well as a continuation of the Romantic rejection of 
Enlightenment rationalism. As Bloom puts it, ‘Life, our life, can be met only by quietism 
or by wilful self-destruction’ (1965, p.173). 
 What Bloom does not recognise is that far from being stark alternatives, it was, 
in a sense, precisely a combination of quietism and self-destruction that emerged as 
one of the dominant topoi of post-Romanticism. The idea that ‘wilful self-destruction’ 
is the appropriate response to the horror of life is, in modern thought, perhaps most 
strongly associated with Schopenhauer and Nietzsche’s respective appropriations of 
the so-called wisdom of Silenus. Nietzsche writes: 
According to the old story, King Midas had long hunted wise Silenus, Dionysus’ 
companion, without catching him. When Silenus had finally fallen into his clutches, the 
king asked him what was the best and most desirable thing of all for mankind. The 
daemon stood silent, stiff and motionless, until at last, forced by the king, he gave a 
shrill laugh and spoke these words: ‘Miserable, ephemeral race, children of hazard and 
hardship, why do you force me to say what it would be much more fruitful for you not 
to hear? The best of all things is something entirely outside your grasp: not to be born, 
not to be, to be nothing. But the second-best thing for you—is to die soon. (1993, p.22) 
Both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche took this to imply that the individual will is a 
sufficient condition of suffering. Because we are already in possession of it, the best 
thing for us would be its early extinction. As Béatrice Han-Pile points out, however, this 
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ought not to be through suicide, which would itself require an exercising of the will 
that would be a ‘paradoxical assertion of a failed aspiration to live’, but, instead, ‘a 
passive relinquishing of the desire to exist, such as death by starvation’ (2006, p.377). 
If quietism suggests the extinction of the will, then Silenus seems to be recommending 
a radical form of this, the experience of complete indifference to life. To be convinced 
of this would be, paradoxically, to will will-less self-destruction. Accepting this, 
Schopenhauer judged life to be undesirable and, accordingly, professed a deeply 
pessimistic philosophy of the will. For Nietzsche, though, the wisdom of Silenus does 
not require a renunciation of life. This, however, is the Romantic Nietzsche of The Birth 
of Tragedy who, like the Shelley of Prometheus Unbound, sees love as the supplement 
and complement of despair, and thus finds a source of consolation in the experience of 
tragedy. Nietzsche famously augurs the return of a tragic culture that ‘turns a steady 
eye on the world as a whole, and seeks to grasp, with a sympathetic love, eternal 
suffering as its own’. This culture of ‘bold … dragon-slayers’ must ‘inevitably yearn for a 
new art of metaphysical consolation’ (1993, p.88). The metaphysical consolation of art 
would provide an experience of the loss of self and a revelation of unindividuated, 
primal will. Within a few years Nietzsche would come bitterly to renounce this notion, 
rejecting Romanticism’s intoxicating blend of love and despair, thus bringing himself in 
line with the position Shelley had marked out in The Triumph of Life and which is then 
taken to its bitter extreme in Yeats’s Come Let Us Mock at the Great. In Nietzsche’s 
case, however, there is a clear difference in that this does still not equate with a total 
rejection of life. Indeed, in rejecting metaphysical consolation, Nietzsche recommends 
instead ‘this-worldly consolation’ (1993, p.11). This raises the question of how, if at all, 
this non-transcendental consolation might manifest itself in post-romantic poetry and 
thereby overcome the nihilistic hopelessness expressed by Yeats. In what remains of 
this paper, I would like to address this in relation to the poetry of Philip Larkin. 
 In our foregoing account the implicit suggestion is that the end of Romanticism 
is announced at the moment that the possibility of some sort of consolatory 
transfiguration or aestheticisation of the world is perceived to be no longer possible 
and in its wake is left a nihilistic feeling of diminishment, the Enlightenment’s 
thoroughly Pyrrhic victory. I have suggested that this development can be traced in the 
poetic winds that blow through beams divine in Blake, to those marked by love and 
despair in Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound, to the wind-change marked by the ‘insulting 
wind’ of his Triumph of Life, to the ‘levelling wind’ of Yeats. In Larkin’s poetry the wind 
drops and there is a sense that the extremes of both Romantic transfiguration and 
angry negation are being left behind for a new austerity that, although disbelieving, 
disenchanted and often mocking, is calmer and more detached, at times almost 
impassive. This much is anticipated by an early poem, The North Ship: Legend, which 
tells the story of three ships. One ship, carried by the wind, sails westward and enjoys 
a happy and prosperous voyage. The second ship sails east and ‘the wind hunted it like 
a beast’ and its voyage was an unhappy one. Both, however, returned in due course. 
But the third ship sailed north and ‘no breath of wind came forth, / And the decks 
shone frostily’. It ‘went wide and far / Into an unforgiving sea / Under a fire-spilling 
star, / And it was rigged for a long journey’. Quietly resilient and charting a course 
between two extremes, this third ship might well be taken to represent Larkin’s poetic 
temperament. The figure of the wind does occasionally appear in his subsequent verse 
but, as in Mr Bleaney, Sad Steps, Talking in Bed and Absences, it tends to be a frigid, 
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cloud-tousling wind that plays an oblique and relatively minor role next to what 
Seamus Heaney, quoting Shakespeare, refers to as the ‘main of light’ (2002, p. 158) in 
Larkin’s work, the still, luminescent air that intermittently features in his verse, 
marking peaks of aesthetic intensity. How might this new post-Romantic clime be 
understood? And how, in light of our discussion of Blake, Shelley and Yeats, might it be 
seen as renegotiating the Romantic legacy of nihilism and consolation? 
 One does not have to go far in Larkin’s poetry to become aware of a certain 
contractedness, expressive of a dejected though quite matter-of-fact sense of life’s 
hopelessness. There is a poignancy to this, a feeling that no matter how well things 
start, they will end badly—not, usually, in catastrophe, but in disappointment. When, 
in Larkin’s poetry, the figure of the wind does appear in its former Romantic guise as 
an emblem of change, there is no sense of there being revolution in the air. On the 
contrary, in fact, rather than announcing something new, it tends to confirm an 
ongoing transformation—not so much an augur of change as an agent of atrophy. 
While in Blake’s Mock On, Mock On the wind blows sand in the eyes of the mockers, 
sand that has been transmuted into gems by beams divine, in Larkin’s poem Skin, time, 
which transforms the ‘unfakable young surface’ of skin into a thickened, loosened ‘old 
bag’, is likened to a ‘continuous coarse / Sand-laden wind’. Similarly, in Afternoons, a 
poem that captures a sad, inevitable, though largely unremarkable, scene change of 
youth passing into middle age, couples stand around in the park in late summer, their 
children playing, as ‘the wind / Is ruining their courting-places / That are still courting-
places / (But the lovers are all in school)’. The poem concludes: 
Their beauty has thickened. 
Something is pushing them 
To the side of their own lives. 
 As Larkin says in Nothing To Be Said, ‘Life is slow dying’, and the things we do, 
the ways in which we live, are ‘Ways of slow dying’. For Larkin the truth of life is 
disappointment. There is no point railing against this fact, as might Nietzsche’s bold 
dragon-slayers, yearning for metaphysical consolation. It is not the fault of some cruel 
or indifferent deity that can be blamed, nor is there a consoling ‘common myth-kitty’ 
(Larkin, 1983, p.79) to dip into as, according to Larkin, the modernists did. This is just 
the way things are. One’s lot cannot even be considered unfair as there is the strong 
suggestion in a number of Larkin’s poems (Mr Bleaney, Toads, Home is so Sad, Sunny 
Prestatyn, for instance) that we end up with the life that our skills, intellect, disposition 
and character warrant. We get the lives we deserve, in other words. ‘*H+ow we live 
measures our own nature’, he writes in Mr Bleaney. Larkin confronts this reality both 
with doleful though detached inevitability, and gentle, ironic mockery, an attitude that 
seems to weigh life lightly, as though viewing it from beyond life. (It is in this light, I 
would argue, that the ironic detachment with which he views Romanticism in Sad 
Steps, and religion in Church Going, should be regarded.) Occasionally, as in Toads and 
Poetry of Departures, there are fantasies about living a different kind of life, but Larkin 
always succeeds in talking himself out of them. The prevailing mood, then, is one of 
fatalism, but a fatalism so passive that it might be viewed as utter indifference. Larkin 
identifies the windowless disappointment of life and accepts it. In the poem Mr 
Bleaney, having been shown the room that Mr Bleaney used to rent, a grim, spartan 
room that still caries memories of the routines of Bleaney’s dull life, Larkin (and not to 
identify the poetic I with Larkin would, in this case, be taking the Barthesian death of 
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the author far too seriously) says ‘I’ll take it’. What he will take remains not entirely 
clear. The room, certainly; but there is also a sense that he is accepting much more 
than that, perhaps even the kind of life the Bleaney had lived. There is a temptation to 
see something vaguely Nietzschean in this affirmation of a nihilistic view of life, and it 
would be quite possible to offer an account of the coming to be of post-Romanticism 
as a move away from a Christian love of despair that characterised Romanticism, 
towards a kind of amor fati. But this, I think, would be to distort Larkin’s poetic 
temperament. What I am suggesting is most striking about his poetry is not a sense of 
love or passion for anything in particular, though love and passion are certainly both 
there if one looks for them. Rather, what is remarkable is the way his devaluing of the 
world is directed, ultimately, towards an apparently impassive indifference that seems 
to affirm meaninglessness and yet simultaneously occupies it in a way that renders it, 
at least potentially, transformative. There is something both purifying and calming 
about this achievement of indifference in Larkin’s verse, a sense of liberty felt as the 
claims of the world, and one’s sense of care in regard to it, fall away.  
 This is particularly clear in the poem Here, which poetically recounts a rail 
journey from London to Hull. It is a journey that moves through urban civilisation 
towards an increasing sense of abstraction, insistently ‘swerving to solitude’. Out 
beyond suburbia the railway line reaches, 
Isolate villages where removed lives 
 
Loneliness clarifies. Here silence stands 
Like heat. Here leaves unnoticed thicken, 
Hidden weeds flower, reflected waters quicken, 
Luminously-peopled air ascends; 
And past the poppies bluish neutral distance 
Ends the land suddenly beyond a beach 
Of shapes and shingle. Here is unfenced existence: 
Facing the sun, untalkative, out of reach. 
Such moments are bereft of wind, whether romantically beneficent or derisively 
mocking. In its place is an empty, impassive stillness, a veritable death-in-life. 
However, this is not posited simply as an alternative to the contracted life of 
disappointment and disenchantment that Larkin’s poetry records so sensitively. It is, 
rather, a consequence of a particular, I would say indifferent, response to it. In other 
words, this experience of ‘unfenced existence’ is only available through an acceptance 
of Bleaney’s ‘one hired box’. Indifference towards a life that is finite and a world that is 
no longer shot through with religious transcendence or the radically transfigurative 
power of the Romantic imagination affords a certain kind of calm, liberating elevation 
in Larkin’s verse. This is notable in a number of his most significant poems and, indeed, 
it constitutes the aesthetic peaks in his verse that, as I have already mentioned, 
Heaney refers to as the ‘main of light’ of Larkin’s poetic imagination. The most famous 
example of this is, undoubtedly, High Windows. Here, after painting a very coarse 
picture of modern life and the unedifying succession of generations, Larkin is suddenly 
left with the rather puzzling ‘thought of high windows:’ 
The sun-comprehending glass, 
And beyond it, the deep blue air, that shows 
Nothing, and is nowhere, and is endless. 
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Again, it is as though the purified detachment of the latter is a dialectical consequence 
of a meditation on the former. In Cut Grass, having contemplated ‘Long, long the 
death’ of mown grass, we are left with an image of ‘high-builded cloud / Moving at 
summer’s pace’. These experiences mark a willless loss of self, a quiescence of the ego 
dissolved in unindividuated space. In Absences he regards the sky’s ‘lit-up galleries’ and 
remarks: ‘Such attics cleared of me! Such absences’. In Water, Larkin reflects that if he 
were ‘called in / To construct a religion’ he would ‘make use of water’. He would ‘raise 
in the east’, 
A glass of water 
Where any-angled light 
Would congregate endlessly. 
But the world for Larkin is as disenchanted as it was at the end of Romanticism in 
Shelley’s The Triumph of Life and Yeats’s Come Let Us Mock at the Great. He makes no 
concession towards the idea of an otherworldly transcendence that would console by 
straightforwardly redeeming this-worldly existence. And yet clearly there does seem to 
be something consoling in the calming indifference of Larkin’s poetry. Might this be 
the sort of immanent consolation the post-romantic Nietzsche envisaged in his 
Attempt at a Self-Criticism, in which he rejects his earlier stance in The Birth of 
Tragedy? The achievement of a clear, unblinking and accepting vision of how things 
are—‘clear / as the bleb of the icicle’ Heaney might say—and, out of that, a sense of 
relief at having surveyed the worst with undeceived eyes? It is as though it is only 
through a negation of the world and of the self—the attainment of a point of complete 
indifference, that is—that any sense of value can be recovered. There is perhaps also a 
sense that deprived of the possibility of aesthetic transcendence of the world, the 
post-Romantic artist must simply step back from the world, cultivating an indifference 
that loosens its ties sufficiently for there to be any art at all.  
 All of this is quite possibly true. And it would mark a clear, I would suggest post-
Romantic, development from the disconsolation of Yeats’s poem. In Larkin’s work, 
there is the possibility of a moderate, imperfect—indifferent, then, in every sense—
consolation that is not at odds with meaninglessness. On the contrary, in fact: any 
consolation in Larkin’s poetry is only possible not by striving against or rejecting 
nihilism, but by frankly accepting it. The loss of transcendence, far from being an 
occasion for despair, would be an opportunity for calming, quietly transformative 
indifference. In this regard, Larkin’s poetry could be understood as instructive as to 
how to live in a post-metaphysical world, how to live in days unrelieved by some sort 
of redeeming, all-transfiguring beyond. In the poem Days, Larkin asks ‘Where can we 
live but days?’, and suggests that ‘solving that question / Brings the priest and the 
doctor / In their long coats / Running over the fields’. To the priest and the doctor 
might we add the post-Romantic poet who now offers to solve that question, not by 
means of an answer so much as a re-thinking of the question ‘What are days for?’ 
 Quite possibly. But although this strikes us as new in the context of the legacy 
of Romanticism, it can actually be understood as reactivating long-established 
responses to human finitude that had perhaps been partly occluded by Romanticism 
and its influence. Taking this longer view, post-Romantic indifferent consolation can 
perhaps be understood as combining elements of Epicureanism and Stoicism with 
aspects of the experience of tragedy in literature. These philosophical and literary 
traditions have their own distinct histories and concerns, of course, but they can be 
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understood as converging on a common idea, and that is calm—perhaps even tinged 
with happiness or joy—when faced with the threat of annihilation. Epicurus referred to 
this state of detachment as ataraxia and the Stoics used the concept of apatheia to 
denote a similar state of indifference or equanimity that results from the purging of 
emotion. The experience of tragic art forms has also, of course, been understood as 
affording a similar sort of purging, leading to what Nietzsche referred to as ‘Greek 
cheerfulness’ (1993, 46). Yeats, likewise, reminds us that ‘Hamlet and Lear are gay’. 
Milton, in the Preface to Samson Agonistes likens this to the way ‘in Physic things of 
melancholic hue and quality are us'd against melancholy, sowr against sowr, salt to 
remove salt humours.’ Larkin’s poetry offers at least a suggestion as to how these 
various forms of achieved ‘indifference’ might perhaps be appropriated and adapted 
to serve a distinctly post-Romantic aesthetic, where nihilism becomes a sort of 
pharmakon and acts as its own consolation. This can of course lead to a sort of 
stupefied, resigned apoliticism. But there is also the tantalising possibility that the 
resulting state, in which the bonds of care and anxiety that usually tie subjectivity so 
closely to everyday, egotistical concerns, are loosened in indifference, might serve as a 
calm, clear, ethical space—an ideal space, as it were—in which the world can be 
radically recast. It is in the hope of the latter that I would like to imagine Larkin’s 
indifferent consolation taking up the legacy of ataraxia and apatheia in the spirit of 
Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus. Here, in what might almost be read as a highly elliptical 
parable of my account of Larkin’s indifferent consolation, the protagonist 
Teufelsdröckh gives his account of what he calls the ‘Centre of Indifference’. He only 
approaches this once the distracting ‘hot Harmattan wind’, significantly a sand-bearing 
West African trade wind, ‘had raged itself out’. He writes: 
Its howl went silent within me; and the long-deafened soul could now hear. I paused in 
my wild wanderings; and sat me down to wait, and consider; for it was as if the hour of 
change drew nigh. I seemed to surrender, to renounce utterly, and say: Fly, then, false 
shadows of Hope; I will chase you no more, I will believe you no more. And ye too, 
haggard spectres of Fear, I care not for you; ye too are all shadows and a lie. Let me 
rest here: for I am way-weary and life-weary; I will rest here, were it but to die: to die 
or to live is alike to me; alike insignificant’. – And again: ‘Here, then, as I lay in that 
Centre of Indifference; cast, doubtless by benignant upper Influence, into a healing 
sleep, the heavy dreams rolled gradually away, and I awoke to a new Heaven and a 
new Earth. The first preliminary moral Act, Annihilation of Self (Selbst-tödtung), had 
been happily accomplished; and my mind’s eyes were now unsealed, and its hands 
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